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Abstract 
The study investigates the role of security officers and the police in dampening the effect of 
insecurity on homicides. Insecurity dynamics are measured in terms of access to weapons, 
violent crime, perception of criminality and political instability. The geographical and 
temporal scopes are respectively 163 countries and 2010-2015. The empirical evidence is 
based on Negative Binomial regressions. Three main findings are established. First, security 
officers and the police significantly lessen the effect of political instability and perception of 
criminality on homicides. Second, an extended analysis with thresholds suggest that a 
maximum deployment of security officers and the police is required in order to completely 
cancel out the impact of both insecurity dynamics on homicides. The concept of threshold 
represents the critical mass at which the negative conditional effect from the interaction 
between security officers and the police completely dampens the effect of insecurity dynamics 
on homicides. Third, the use of security officers and the police is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the complete eradication of insecurity-related homicides. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The study is motivated by three main concerns in policy and academic circles. They are: (i) 
the growing rate of homicides around the world, (ii) gaps in the homicides literature and (iii)  
the policy importance of curtailing the wave of murders. These three issues are expanded in 
chronological order.  
First, consistent with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
deaths resulting from homicides around the world are higher than those arising from conflicts 
and wars (UNODC, 2013). Such a high rate of murder represents a significant threat to the 
security of civilians. According to the narrative, in the light of the sheer magnitude of the 
number of lives lost to homicide, policies towards arresting the flow are paramount at the 
local, national and international levels. This is primarily because the right to life is enshrined 
both in constitutional and international laws as a supreme normative. Hence, the key 
obligations of governments and multilateral development institutions is to: (i) protect civilians 
against unlawful killings, (ii) safeguard the lives of those threatened with murder, (iii) enforce 
the rule of law through security officers and the police and (iv) assign the responsibility of 
dealing with homicides to the right  jurisdictions within a criminal justice system on time. 
More specifically, the obligation to protect human life is fundamental in any country’s 
attempt to develop strategies that prevent crime. Theoretically speaking, the positioning of 
this study on the role of security officers and the police in modulating the effect of insecurity 
on homicides is of policy relevance in crime prevention.  
 Second, in accordance with Asongu and Acha-Anyi (2018), recent homicide literature 
has focused primarily on, inter alia: the consequences for human and social welfare of the 
interaction of economics with homicides (Bourne et al., 2015); the relationship between 
homicide and age (Rogers, 2014); a survey of homicide from intimate partners (Stöcklet al., 
2013); homicides and violence from cross-national views (Cole & Gramajo, 2009; Ouimet & 
Montmagny-Grenier, 2014); research issues pertaining to homicide and punishment in Europe 
(Liem & Campbell, 2014); meta assessments of cross-country homicide predictors (Nivette, 
2011); the effects of economic development, income inequality and infant mortality on 
homicides (Ouimet, 2012); the connection between inequitable distribution of national wealth 
and homicides in technically-advanced nations (Chamlin & Cochran, 2006;  Jacobs & 
Richardson, 2008); global comparative persistence in homicides (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 
2018) and the relationship between police performance and the rate of homicide (Pare, 2014). 
This last study in the existing literature is closest to the arguments in this paper. Nevertheless, 
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the current study departs from Pare (2014) in three key ways: (i) we use updated panel data 
for the period 2010 to 2015 instead of data averaged from 1998-2002; (ii) our focus is on 163 
countries instead of 77 nations and (iii) the results of our Negative Binomial regressions 
reflect more causality than those of Pare (2014) which can be interpreted merely as 
correlations.  The findings are also more robust to misspecification errors arising from 
endogeneous variables because contemporary data on homicides are regressed on non-
contemporary security officers and police. Hence our results are more in accord with current 
international programs on crime prevention than those reported by Pare (2014).  
Third, beyond the emphasis on the policy implications of this study as outlined in the 
first strand above, the international community in the post-2015 SDG agenda is particularly 
interested in the connection between security, violence and human development within the 
framework of the rule of law (UNODC, 2013). Accordingly, the damaging effects of 
homicide could have ramifications beyond the loss of human life because it potentially 
threatens the wellbeing of the general population by instilling a sense of insecurity and fear. 
When there are unacceptable levels of killings among a substantial swathe of the population, 
social cohesion and social capital are significantly undermined. Moreover, as documented by 
Maggah and Carvalho (2017), the corollaries of homicides in terms of unproductive spending 
on public and private security and the loss of productivity owing to premature deaths, are 
stifling the economic development of nations where such murders are prevalent.  
By investigating the importance of security officers and the police in controlling the 
effect of insecurity on homicides, the study responds to topical issues in policy and scholarly 
circles (articulated in the first and third strands) in order to complement the emerging 
literature covered in the second strand. Therefore, the objective of the study is twofold, 
notably to: (i) provide insights into how country-level plans to enhance security through the 
recruitment of more officers and the police could be implemented in order to  lower the 
number of homicide cases and  (ii) assess the existing capacity of the international community 
to adequately prevent and respond to policy syndrome of homicides1. While the first objective 
is  evaluated by quantifying the overall benefits of modulating the effect of insecurity on 
homicides  through security officers and the police, the second objective is examined by 
calculating thresholds at which the involvement of security officers and the police completely 
                                                          
1Fosu (2013) defines policy syndromes as situations that are detrimental to growth: ‘administered redistribution’, 
‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation’. Asongu (2017) considers 
a policy syndrome as a gap in knowledge economy while Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) consider it as growth 
that is not inclusive. Within the context of this study, policy syndrome is referred to as incidences of homicide 
and circumstances that fuel homicide.  
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cancels out the harmful effect of insecurity on homicides. Insecurity dynamics are defined 
from four main perspectives, namely: access to weapons; violent crime; perception of 
criminality and political instability. Insecurity measurements within the context of this study 
refer to the various channels that could promote incidents of homicide. The research question 
which the study aims to answer is stated as follows: “how does the involvement of security 
officers and the police modulate the effect of insecurity on homicides across the world?” 
 The theoretical foundation underlying this study is the Wound Culture Theory (WCT). 
The philosophy that is explored here is that it is the responsibility of security officers and the 
police to enforce the rule of law and prevent the occurrence of the aforementioned insecurity 
dynamics (inter alia: access to weapons; violent crime; perception of criminality and political 
instability) which fuel a wound culture with associated externalities such as homicide.  
 As articulated by Gibson (2006), the Wound Culture Theory which was first proposed 
by Mark Seltzer (1998) can be summarized in the following (p. 19):                                                                                         
“Serial killing has its place in a public culture in which addictive violence has become not 
merely a collective spectacle but one of the crucial sites where private desire and public 
fantasy cross. The convening of the public around scenes of violence–the rushing to the scene 
of the accident, the milling around the point of impact–has come to make up a wound culture; 
the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and open persons, a collective 
gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound”.  
 According to the WCT, the desire to have the human body shattered is harbored by 
some individuals in society. Such a wish to rip the human body asunder is both figurative 
(through criticism) and literally (through mutilation). The relevance of serial murder is 
observed as the communal focus enabling citizens to commit to wound appreciation: “One 
discovers again and again the excitations in the opening of private and bodily and psychic 
interiors; the exhibition and witnessing, the endlessly reproducible display of wounded bodies 
and wounded minds in public. In wound culture, the very notion of sociality is bound to the 
excitations of the torn and open body, the torn and exposed individual, as public spectacle” 
(Seltzer, p. 137). Seltzer (p. 21) further observed that the wound culture theory has substantial 
implications for citizenry attitude formation: “The spectacular public representation of 
violated bodies, across a range of official, academic, and media accounts, in fiction and in 
film, has come to function as a way of imagining and situating our notions of public, social, 
and collective identity.” The underlying wound culture which is likely to be fuelled by a 
policy syndrome of insecurity can intuitively be curbed by security officers and the police in 
order to enforce law, order and the right to life.                                                                                                                                     
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the  data and 
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the results. We conclude in Section 4 with policy 
implications and future research directions.   
 
2. Data and methodology 
In this study, we focus on a panel of 163 countries with data from 2010 to 2015. The data is 
obtained from a multitude of sources, namely: a Qualitative assessment by the Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
Surveys on Crime Trends; the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (CTS) and the United Nations Committee on Contributions. The 
analysis is limited to 2010-2015 due to data availability constraints.  The choice of start date 
is consistent with the evolving homicide literature. This is guided by the desire to provide 
empirical outcomes which are informed by today’s international policy initiatives to combat 
the various forms of insecurity dynamics (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2018).  
 The main outcome variable is the number of homicides (per 100,000 people). This 
mirrors the prevalence of violent crime and deaths in a country. The data on homicide is 
collectively from the EIC, UNODC and CTS estimates. The main policy variable is the 
number of security officers and the police (per 100,000 people). Insecurity measurements 
include the following four policy syndromes: access to weapons, violent crime, perception of 
criminality and political instability. It is hypothesized that the prevalence of these variables is 
conducive for murder and homicides. Moreover, they have been used in contemporary 
literature on conflicts and crimes (Wood, 2015; Mallet, 2015; D’Amico & Williamson, 2015; 
Rao et al., 2016; Kopkin, Brodsky, & DeMatteo, 2017; Wilderman & Wang, 2017; Olashore, 
Okanni  & Olashore, 2017; Kjellstrand, 2017).  
 The four control variables employed in the regression are: the number of armed 
service personnel (per 100,000 people), the number of people incarcerated (per 100,000 
people), the likelihood of violent demonstrations and military expenditure (as a percentage of 
GDP). From theory, military expenditure and armed service personnel are expected to reduce 
homicides whereas violent demonstrations and incarcerations should be positively correlated 
with murders and killings. The selection of these control variables is supported by the 
literature on the drivers of homicide, violent crimes and conflicts (see Blanco & Grier, 2009; 
Freytag,Kruger, Meierrieks, & Schneider, 2011; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016; GPI, 2016; 
Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2018). 
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 The definitions and sources of variables are presented in Table 1, the summary 
statistics and list of countries in the study are disclosed in Table 2. Table 3 provides the 
pairwise correlation matrix which helps notify on the possibility of multicollinearity in 
variables contained in the conditioning information set. From the descriptive statistics in 
Table 2, it is obvious that the Means of the variables are comparable. Also, from 
corresponding variations, we are confident that reasonable relationships will emerge from the 
regression analyses.  
 The relatively high correlation between the four policy syndromes is addressed by 
employing them in distinct specifications. We note that the correlation between the control 
variables is comparatively low, although the correlation between armed forces personnel and 
military expenditure is slightly in excess of 0.5. Similarly, the correlation between policy 
syndromes and the violent demonstration variable is higher than 0.5. However, Brambor, 
Clark and Golder (2006) explain that in interactive regressions such as those employed in this 
study, the issue of high correlations with potential multicollinearity is normally overlooked. 
This is because the overall effects are based on the net effects that are computed from 
estimated unconditional and conditional coefficients. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions of variables and sources  
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Access to Weapons  Ease of access to small arms and light weapons 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Violent crime  Level of violent crime 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Perceptions of Criminality  Level of perceived criminality in society 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Armed Services Personnel Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Violent demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Access to Weapons  3.116 1.080 1.000 5.000 978 
Violent crime  2.768 1.136 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Criminality  3.153 0.917 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Armed Services Personnel 1.648 0.725 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Violent demonstrations  2.912 0.969 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
 “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size = 978) 
           
Policy Syndromes Control Variables Policy V Dep. V  
Weapons Crime Criminality Pol. Inst ASP Incarce Demon Mil Exp. SOP  Homicide  
1.000 0.670 0.644 0.616 -0.093 -0.151 0.549 0.167 0.001 0.526 Weapons 
 1.000 0.683 0.479 -0.229 -0.116 0.598 -0.027 -0.122 0.585 Crime 
  1.000 0.509 -0.076 -0.093 0.502 0.116 0.017 0.476 Criminality  
   1.000 0.127 -0.140 0.647 0.336 0.042 0.236 Pol. Inst. 
    1.000 0.276 -0.082 0.582 0.287 -0.163 ASP 
     1.000 -0.204 0.093 0.279 0.161 Incarce 
      1.000 0.069 -0.093 0.270 Demon 
       1.000 0.215 -0.098 Mil. Exp. 
        1.000 -0.022 SOP 
         1.000 Homicide 
           
Weapons: Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Criminality: Perceptions of criminality. Pol. Inst: Political instability. ASP: Armed 
Service Personnel. Incarce: Incarcerations. Demon: Violent demonstrations. Mil Exp : Military Expenditure. SOP : Security Officers and 
Police.   Policy V: Policy Variable. Dep. V: Dependent Variable. 55% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0627 for n = 978.  
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2.2 Methodology 
 
Given the positive skewness in the data, a negative binomial regression is employed in 
accordance with the latest literature on positively-skewed outcome variables (Choi& Luo, 
2013; Choi, 2015). In a negative binomial regression, the mean of the outcome variable y is 
determined by the exposure time t  and a set of  k explanatory variables (the x’s). The 
empirical expression relating these quantities is: ��= �xp(ln(��) + �1�1� + �2�2� + ⋯ + �k�k�),                                                             (1) 
 
where, �1 ≡ 1 and β1 is the intercept. The symbols β1, β2, …, βk correspond to unknown 
parameters to be estimated. Their estimates are symbolized as b1, b2, …, bk. The fundamental 
negative binomial regression model for an observation i is written as:  
  iy
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(2) 
where,  ii t and 
1 in the generalised Poisson distribution which  includes a gamma 
noise variable with a Mean of 1 and a scale of  . The parameter μ represents the Mean 
incidence rate of y per unit of exposure or time. Hence, μ is the risk of a new occurrence of 
the event during a specified exposure period, t (NCSS, 2017). Consistent with the literature 
(Choi & Luo, 2013; Choi, 2015; Mlachila, Tapsoba & Tapsoba, 2017; Asongu, Anyanwu, & 
Tchamyou, 2017a), the explanatory variables are lagged by one year in order to  correct for 
potential endogeneity bias. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 Table 4 presents the results of our negative binomial regressions. Whereas the first 
panel involves regressions without a conditioning information set, the second includes control 
variables.  
We recall that the first aim of this study is to assess the significance of security 
officers and the police in modulating the damaging influence of insecurity on homicides. To 
this end, we computed the net effects and thresholds of these two policy tools along the lines 
suggested by Tchamyou (2018) and Tchamyou and Asongu (2017).  For example, in Column 
4 of Table 4, the net effect calculated from the interception of security officers and the police 
on the perception of criminality is 0.209 (i.e., [-0.068× 2.728] + [0.395]), where: 0.395 is the 
unconditional effect from the perception of criminality; 2.728 is the Mean value of security 
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officers and police and -0.068 is the conditional effect of the interaction between the 
“perception of criminality” with “security officers and police”. 
The second objective is to investigate the robustness of existing international security 
arrangements in preventing and nullifying the consequences of homicide occurrences. This 
aim is assessed by computing thresholds at which security officers and the police completely 
wipe out the destructive impact of insecurity on homicides. 
  
Table 4:Negative binomial regressions  
         
 Dependent variable: Homicides  
  
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  0.137 0.160 -0.265 0.513*** 0.144 0.109 -0.357 0.386* 
 (0.525) (0.382) (0.282) (0.000) (0.532) (0.577) (0.182) (0.067) 
Security Officers & Police(SOP)(-1) 0.081 0.093 0.226*** 0.105 0.025 0.082 0.196** 0.075 
 (0.284) (0.134) (0.008) (0.136) (0.746) (0.200) (0.024) (0.294) 
Access to Weapons(-1) 0.271*** --- --- --- 0.259*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
Violent Crime(-1) --- 0.269*** --- --- --- 0.282*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.000)   
Perceptions of Criminality(-1) --- --- 0.395*** --- --- --- 0.372*** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
Political Instability(-1) --- --- --- 0.190*** --- --- --- 0.157** 
    (0.001)    (0.015) 
Access to Weapons×SOP(-1) -0.024 --- --- --- -0.010 --- --- --- 
 (0.242)    (0.624)    
Violent Crime(-1)×SOP(-1) --- -0.021 --- --- --- -0.024 --- --- 
  (0.251)    (0.221)   
Perceptions of Criminality×SOP(-1) --- --- -0.068*** --- --- --- -0.062** --- 
   (0.004)    (0.012)  
Political Instability×SOP(-1) --- --- --- -0.038* --- --- --- -0.026 
    (0.088)    (0.249) 
Armed Services Personnel(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.051 -0.036 -0.068* -0.117*** 
     (0.194) (0.352) (0.081) (0.003) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.132*** 0.101*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.010 -0.013 0.044* 0.074 
     (0.689) (0.627) (0.084) (0.011) 
Military Expenditure (-1) --- --- --- --- -0.092*** -0.033 -0.054* -0.053 
     (0.006) (0.300) (0.093) (0.118) 
     
 
 
 
 
Net Effect  na na 0.209 0.086 na na 0.202 na 
Threshold na na 5.808 5.000 na na 6.000 na 
         
Log likelihood  -1296.652 -1285.901 -1305.715 -1339.818 -1274.628 -1275.135 -1288.291 -1314.974 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  111.23*** 132.73*** 93.11*** 24.90*** 155.28*** 154.26*** 127.95*** 74.59*** 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) for Lnalpha -
33.673*** 
-
33.673*** 
-
33.673*** 
-
33.673*** 
-
33.673*** 
-
33.673*** 
127.95*** -
33.673*** 
Observations  815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Security Officers & Police: 2.728.Minimum and Maximum 
values of  Security Officers & Police are respectively 1.081 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects 
of insecurity variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables. The 
difference between the uniform sample size and total number of observations in the regression output is due to issues of missing 
observations. 
 
The result in Column 4 indicate that given that the unconditional effect of “perception of 
criminality” is positive and the conditional interactive effect is negative, the critical mass or 
threshold at which the unconditional positive effect of “perception on criminality” is 
completely neutralised by security officers and the police is 5.808 (0.395/0.068). 
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Unfortunately, the computed threshold has less economic relevance because it is not within 
the range (minimum to maximum) of security officers and police disclosed in the summary 
statistics2. This implies that more policy initiatives aimed at completely removing the 
damaging influence of insecurity on homicides (by involving security officers and the police) 
are required. More specifically, the results confirm that while there will always be insecurity-
related killings and murders, the deployment of security officers and the police is a necessary 
not a sufficient condition for a total eradication of insecurity-inspired homicides. Nonetheless, 
the negative unconditional effect implies that the involvement of security officers and the 
police significantly lowers the impact of “political instability” and “perception of criminality” 
on homicides. The threshold related to political instability is within policy range because it 
reflects the maximum value disclosed in Table 2 for summary statistics. The economic 
significance of this estimated cut-off point is that a full deployment of security officers and 
the police is required to reduce the effect of insecurity dynamics on homicides. 
The notion that threshold levels represent the critical masses at which the negative 
conditional effect from the interaction between security officers and the police completely 
cancels the effect of insecurity dynamics on homicides is supported by evidence in the 
literature. They comprise studies on: (i) thresholds for favourable impacts (Cummins, 2000) 
and requirements essential for U-shaped and inverted U-shaped relationships (Roller & 
Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015); (ii) thresholds at which information and communication 
technology enhances environment sustainability (Asongu, le Roux, & Biekpe,2018a),  
inclusive human development (Asongu & le Roux, 2017) and mitigates the damaging effect 
of environmental degradation on inclusive development (Asongu, le Roux, & Biekpe, 2017b), 
and (iii) essential information sharing thresholds in the mitigation of information asymmetry 
for financial access (Asongu, le Roux, & Tchamyou, 2018b). Our finding on the significance 
of the role of security and police officers in reducing insecurity-related homicides is broadly 
supported by Pare (2014).  
 The statistical significance of the control variables displays the expected signs. For 
instance, as expected, “armed service personnel” and military expenditure have a negative 
effect on homicides while incarcerations and violent demonstrations are positively associated 
with it.  
 
                                                          
2It is important to note that while the security officers and police are per 100, 000 people, the values are coded on 
a 1 to 5 scale according to the level of security. Moreover, security officers and police within this context refer to 
civil police force as distinct from local militia and national guards. 
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4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
The study investigated the relevance of the involvement of security officers and the police in 
preventing and dampening the destructive effect of insecurity on homicides. Insecurity is 
measured in terms of four policy syndromes: access to weapons, violent crime, perception of 
criminality and political instability. The geographical and temporal  possibilities are limited 
respectively to 163 countries and 2010-2015. Two major findings are confirmed from eight  
negative binomial regressions with or without control variables. They are:  
First, security officers and the police significantly lower the potential harmful effect of 
“political instability” and “perception of criminality” on homicides. Second, while the 
estimated net effect on homicide of the deployment of security officers and the police is 
positive, the threshold at which their involvement is predicted to completely nullify the 
influence of political instability on homicides is the only estimate that is practically viable. 
This is because the implied cut-off point for the number of security officers and the police 
needed to completely wipe out the consequences of political instability on homicide 
occurrences is within the maximum values observed in the countries of study. The economic 
interpretation of the estimated cut-off points is that a full deployment of security officers and 
the police is needed to weaken the effect of insecurity dynamics on homicides. Then too, the 
fact that the computed thresholds are considerably higher than the historical average values 
observed for the countries of study is a further indication that the contribution of security 
officers and the police need to be complemented with other policy initiatives in order to 
completely stem the wave of insecurity-related homicides. The following policy 
recommendations are noteworthy. 
 In tackling homicides relating to insecurity dynamics (i.e. access to weapons, violent 
crime, political instability and perception of criminality), security officers and the police are 
discouraged from using repressive actions. It follows from our findings that suppressive 
tactics by the authorities are most likely to be counter-productive if not complemented with 
additional strategies which assuage the influence of the other determinants of homicide and 
insecurity. These extra policy initiatives should be designed to deal with concerns about youth 
education and employment, socio-economic inequalities and access to public goods and 
services. These may include measures which: (i) encourage the use of new information and 
communications technologies in youth education and crime prevention campaigns. Such 
interactive methods should ensure that the various stakeholders in society are more conscious 
of the connection between homicide and general wellbeing; (ii) localise crime preventive 
programs and specifically target known hotspots for violence and homicides in the area; (iii) 
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emphasise the importance of gun control and the effects of income inequality and drug use on 
homicides and (vi) underscore the proliferation of cybercrime and its implications for 
homicides.  
 Future research directions should focus on individual country case studies in order to 
identify more targeted country-oriented homicide determinants and their solutions. Moreover, 
the findings here show that the involvement of security officers and the police is necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the complete eradication of insecurity-related homicides. 
Consequently, an assessment of the complementary policy tools which enhances the role of 
security officers and the police in preventing and nullifying the effect of insecurity dynamics 
on homicides is worthwhile. 
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